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INTRODUCTION
“Across the federal government, we are beginning to observe the
dawn of a new chapter—perhaps even a digital revolution—in how
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government does its work.”1 This “new chapter,” as described in a new
report commissioned by the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS Report),2 is the use of artificial intelligence (AI)3 in the
federal government—what the report terms “algorithmic governance.”4
The ACUS Report documents 157 instances of algorithmic governance
in several federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies.5
The Social Security Administration (SSA), for example, has
implemented a system called Insight, which administrative law judges
(ALJ) and the SSA Appeals Council use for quality assurance.6 At the
hearing level, an ALJ uses Insight to identify problems in draft decisions,
such as citing incorrect authority or certain internal discrepancies.7 The
SSA Appeals Council can use the program to find inconsistencies in the
ALJ decision from which the claimant appealed.8
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses several
algorithmic systems in its enforcement efforts.9 One such system, the
Corporate Issuer Risk Assessment, uses around 200 metrics to identify
irregular patterns in corporate financial statements.10 The system uses
information from past enforcement actions and past filings.11 SEC
employees analyze and use the results to allocate its enforcement
resources.12
Besides enforcement, federal agencies are using algorithmic
governance to aid in adjudication. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
uses AI tools to adjudicate patent and trademark applications.13 One
prototype tool uses deep learning to identify existing marks from a

1 DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 91 (2020), https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CWFKU5R].
2 Id.
3 By artificial intelligence, this Essay takes “a broad approach to predictive analytics captured
under various umbrella terms, including ‘big data analytics,’ ‘deep learning,’ ‘reinforcement
learning,’ ‘smart machines,’ ‘neural networks,’ ‘natural language processing,’ and ‘learning
algorithms.’” Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2019).
4 ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 9.
5 Id. at 6, 88.
6 Id. at 37-45.
7 Id. at 40-41.
8 Id. at 40.
9 Id. at 22-25. Other agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, the Customs and Border
Protection, and Transportation Security Administration, are employing AI in enforcement
activities. See id. at 10.
10 Id. at 23.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 46.
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database that are like the applied-for mark.14 Other tools used by the
agency aim to automate mark and patent classification.15
The ACUS Report highlights several legal, policy, and institutional
concerns about algorithmic governance, including: (1) the possibility for
bias in the algorithms16 or the violation of due process rights;17 (2) the
lack of transparency and public accountability;18 and (3) the danger that
regulatory targets might unfairly game or exploit the algorithmic models
to their advantage.19 Scholars and commentators have raised these issues
before, especially in the context of algorithmic governance at the state
and local level.20
What scholarly discourse lacks is any significant discussion into
how algorithmic governance may upset and undermine the
“administrative separation of powers.”21 As proposed by Professor Jon
Michaels, the theory of the administrative separation of powers contends
that the administrative state remains legitimate and consistent with our
constitutional precepts so long as it retains the “dispositional
characteristics” of the traditional branches of government.22 Michaels
argues that the three classic branches of government—the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches—have been reconstructed in the
administrative state.23 Playing the role of the executive is the politically
accountable agency leadership.24 The judiciary is found in the
disinterested, independent, legally-protected, and professionalized civil
service.25 And standing in as the legislature is a vibrant and diverse civil
society—the members of which use administrative processes to debate,
educate, and keep the other two subconstitutional branches accountable.26
Maintaining this administrative separation of powers promotes our
constitutional commitments to a constrained and rivalrous government,
14

Id. at 49.
Id. at 48-49.
16 Id. at 79-81.
17 Id. at 82-85.
18 Id. at 75-78.
19 Id. at 86-87.
20 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249
(2008); Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed
Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364 (2019); Virginia Eubanks, We
Created Poverty. Algorithms Won’t Make that Go Away, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/13/we-created-poverty-algorithmswont-make-that-go-away [https://perma.cc/8JVL-827N].
21 See generally Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 515 (2015) (laying out the theory of administrative separation of powers).
22 Id. at 530; see also id. at 551-53.
23 Id. at 556-59.
24 Id. at 556.
25 Id. at 556-58; see also id. at 540-47.
26 Id. at 558-59; see also id. at 547.
15
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and for that reason, qualifies the administrative state as a worthy heir to
the Framers’ tripartite regime.27
Michaels has sounded the alarm on how this subconstitutional
framework is being undone by the rise of privatization.28 Privatization—
whether in the form of contracting out important federal tasks29 or
“marketizing” the civil service30—usurps power from the bureaucracy
and the civil society and amasses it within agency leadership through
various means.31
Like privatization’s constitutional threat, this Essay contends that
algorithmic governance threatens to dismantle the subconstitutional
checks and balances within administrative agencies by creating
concentrated, unchecked power at the agency leadership level.
I. A NEW THREAT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Algorithmic governance could undermine the administrative
separation of powers because its use consolidates agency leader control
at the expense of the civil service and civil society. Algorithmic
governance does this by allowing leaders to: (1) unilaterally advance their
agenda; (2) marginalize and erode the civil service; and (3) restrain public
participation.
A.

Unilateral Advancement of Agency Leaders’ Agenda

The first way algorithmic governance creates concentrated agency
leader power is by allowing leaders to unilaterally advance their policy
agenda. Algorithmic governance, or a “robo-bureaucrat,” is programmed
to engage in a specified function and abide by certain protocol—all of
which are likely to be directly informed by agency leaders.32 In other
words, a robo-bureaucrat is more or less programmed to do what the
agency leaders want and it must abide by its programming. If a robo27

See generally id. at 553-60.
See id. at 570-95; see also JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S
THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017) [hereinafter MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP].
29 See Michaels, supra note 21, at 578-79.
30 See id. at 583-85.
31 See MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 28, at 119-41.
32 See, e.g., ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 39 (observing that agency leadership played a
key role in developing the algorithmic governing systems at the Social Security Administration);
see also AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS: CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT USE OF
ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 7-8 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H86H-8AKS] (observing that agencies adopting benefits assessments algorithmic
systems often enter into contracts with third-party contractors that design and implement the
systems, leaving front-line agency personnel with little involvement in how the system works).
28
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bureaucrat, for some reason, goes rogue33 and pushes back against the
agency head, agency leadership can likely replace or reprogram it with
little resistance.34 This compliant robot stands in sharp contrast to the
independent, professionalized, legally protected, and often rivalrous civil
service.35
B.

Marginalization & Erosion of the Civil Service

The second way algorithmic governance consolidates agency leader
control is by marginalizing the civil service. It does this in at least three
ways. First, government agencies are likely to use algorithmic
governance to replace important civil service discretionary duties and
work altogether.36 There is little indication that governments will end
their foray into algorithmic governance: it is hard to imagine cashstrapped agencies declining automation when automation’s advocates
promise increased efficiency, productivity, cost-savings, and quality of
public services.37 Indeed, one report suggests that AI and machine
learning may replace or change 130,000 federal jobs in the next two

33 See, e.g., Greg Swanson, Comment, Non-Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Programs and
Products Liability: How New AI Products Challenge Existing Liability Models and Pose New
Financial Burdens, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1201, 1205-06 (2019) (describing how Microsoft’s
online chat-bot went rogue and “became grossly offensive and racist” within twenty-four hours of
implementation).
34 There is little reason to suspect that once an algorithmic governance system is in place,
agency leadership will have any significant legal or political obstacles in removing, replacing, or
reprogramming it upon finding that the system went “rogue.” See, e.g., Federal Suit Settlement:
End of Value-Added Measures for Teacher Termination in Houston, AM. FED’N OF TEACHERS
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.aft.org/press-release/federal-suit-settlement-end-value-addedmeasures-teacher-termination-houston [https://perma.cc/ZY2U-VVU6] (reporting that a school
district agreed not to use an algorithm to evaluate teachers after the teachers’ union sued the district;
the district also agreed to allow teachers to recommend changes to the district’s teacher evaluation
procedure); Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE VERGE
(Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaidalgorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/N8VM-5NQG] (reporting that Idaho agreed to
improve its algorithmic system used for determining home care benefits after the system went
“haywire”).
35 See Michaels, supra note 21, at 540-47.
36 See, e.g., ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 11, 28 (observing how AI may replace expertise
and discretion in the federal bureaucracy).
37 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1161 (2017); DELOITTE, THE NEW
MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: ROBOTIC PROCESS AUTOMATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 1
(2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/Innovation/deloitte-ukinnovation-the-new-machinery-of-govt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT8H-WL9V]; DINAND TINHOLT ET
AL., CAPGEMINI CONSULTING, UNLEASHING THE POTENTIAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3 (2017) https://www.capgemini.com/consulting/wp-content/uploads/sites/
30/2017/10/ai-in-public-sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/23J6-ARRS].
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decades.38 As the ACUS Report observed, “[t]he advent of algorithmic
enforcement may . . . supplant expertise within the federal bureaucracy,
exacerbating a perceived trend toward politicized federal administration
and the hollowing out of the administrative state.”39
Although algorithmic governance has yet to displace the federal
civil service in any significant way, as the technology advances in
sophistication, government agencies may use AI to shape and replace
“discretion at all levels of bureaucracy.”40 Indeed, it is not hard to imagine
the federal government replacing workers with automated systems that
would provide licenses to pilots, close factories violating environmental
protection regulations, and find that a proposed merger violates antitrust
law.41
Labor unions representing federal employees appear to lack any
power to fight back against AI displacing civil service jobs and duties. To
begin with, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act
(FSLMR)42—the act governing labor relations in most of the federal
public sector—provides that management has the right “to assign work,
to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine
the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted.”43 So
federal agencies have the unilateral right to control what duties to assign
and to whom or what positions job responsibilities will be assigned.44
And in a similar vein, agencies also may unilaterally contract out certain
functions.45 It follows that management rights could be construed to
cover an agency’s decision to replace an employee’s job responsibilities
with a robo-bureaucrat. As a result, a labor union likely cannot, for
example, demand to bargain over the agency’s decision to supplant a civil
service employee’s duties with a machine.
And although the FSLMR provides that agencies and unions may
negotiate the technology, methods, and means of performing work, this

38 See Jerry Bowles, AI Will Change or Eliminate 130,000 Federal Jobs Over the Next Two
Decades, DIGINOMICA (Mar. 5, 2019), https://diginomica.com/ai-will-change-or-eliminate130000-federal-jobs-over-the-next-two-decades [https://perma.cc/4EGD-3UPL].
39 ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 28; see also Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 37, at 1176
(observing that algorithms may potentially “transform key governmental functions in ways that not
only augment human judgment but replace it with automated, algorithmic analysis”); Citron, supra
note 20, at 1252 (“Because automation radically reduces the human role in executing government
policy and programs, state and federal governments can cut staff and close field offices.”).
40 ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 11.
41 See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 37, at 1170-71, 1171 n.103.
42 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-06 (2018).
43 Id. § 7106(a)(2)(B).
44 Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Council of Prison Locals 33, Local 506, 66 F.L.R.A. 819, 823 (2012).
45 U.S. Dep’t of Army Corps of Eng’rs, Nw. Div. & Portland Dist., 60 F.L.R.A. 595, 597
(2005).
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negotiation may only occur “at the election of the agency.”46 So even
when an agency deploys AI to merely complement a civil service
worker’s decision making, the agency’s decision is likely only negotiable
when the agency decides it is negotiable. Of course, even though a union
likely cannot negotiate over the decision to replace duties or federal
workers with a robo-bureaucrat, the negotiable effects of the decision
may be within the duty to bargain.47
Several government agencies at the state level have already begun
replacing important state worker decisions with those of machines. For
example, in 2013, the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency
implemented MiDAS, an algorithmic decision-making system used to
detect unemployment insurance fraud.48 By implementing this system,
Michigan sought to save the state money and replace around 400 state
workers.49 MiDAS ended up falsely accusing over 34,000 unemployed
people of fraud.50 Across other state and local agencies, algorithmic
governance is replacing human decision making in areas such as social
services and criminal justice.51
Second, algorithmic governance creates a vulnerable civil service.
As discussed, when AI becomes more advanced and widespread in
government, it is probable that certain swaths of the civil service will be
in danger of being replaced.52 This threat will contribute to public
workers’ feelings of job insecurity—feelings already exacerbated by
nationwide efforts to remove for-cause protection from the civil service.53
And the advent of what may be characterized as “robo-boss”—an
algorithmic system used to manage employees—may leave workers in

46 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1); see Overseas Educ. Ass’n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 827 F.2d
814, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the employer did not have to negotiate a union proposal
that required the employer to provide its schools with a telephone for its employees to use;
reasoning that because the employees would use the telephones for government business, it related
to the technology, means, and methods of performing work).
47 See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 59 F.L.R.A. 48, 50 (2003).
48 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941,
1954-57 (2019).
49 Editorial: State Will Pay for Cutting Corners With Unemployment System Automation,
TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.record-eagle.com/opinion/editorials/
editorial-state-will-pay-for-cutting-corners-with-unemployment-system/article_6794c522-192b11ea-9df2-676c5450b875.html [https://perma.cc/5JEY-8XGV]; Robert N. Charette, Michigan’s
MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm Alchemy Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Jan. 24, 2018, 17:00 GMT), https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/software/michigansmidas-unemployment-system-algorithm-alchemy-that-created-lead-not-gold
[https://perma.cc/QT4U-3T57].
50 Charette, supra note 49.
51 See Valentine, supra note 20, at 366-67 (discussing algorithms guiding police officer
investigatory decisions and determining caseworkers’ public benefits determinations).
52 See supra pp. 103–05.
53 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1049-50 (2013).
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the civil service even more defenseless. For example, a Texas school
district implemented a teacher appraisal algorithmic system to make
termination decisions allegedly using data from classroom statistics
throughout Texas, performance of the teacher’s students, and the
teacher’s performance record.54 A lawsuit over the school district’s use
of this system argued, in part, that there was no way teachers could verify
the accuracy of the algorithm’s scores.55 The court agreed, observing that
uncontradicted testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert confirmed that the
algorithm’s teacher scores would “remain a mysterious ‘black box,’
impervious to challenge.”56 So “teachers have no meaningful way to
ensure correct calculation of their . . . scores, and as a result are unfairly
subject to mistaken deprivation of constitutionally protected property
interests in their jobs.”57 And thus a robo-boss’s inscrutable decisionmaking processes—like the system in Texas—could prevent public
workers from challenging, in any meaningful way, a robo-boss’s
employment decisions.
Third, algorithmic governance creates a more compliant civil
service. With the threat of intelligence automation looming, the
bureaucracy is less likely to challenge agency leaders’ decisions and
policies for fear of being replaced by an automaton.58 For that reason,
even though the civil service might still perform certain governmental
functions, the robo-bureaucrat threat would create a more compliant and
subservient public workforce.59 This result would further an agency
leader’s pursuit of securing unitary control over the administrative state.
In a similar vein, even when a civil servant uses or oversees an
algorithmic governance system, that worker may be subject to
“automation bias”: “the over-reliance of decision-makers on automated
predictions, even when such deference is unreasonable and mistaken.”60
For example, “[u]nder the influence of automation bias, workers will
likely adopt a computer’s suggested eligibility determinations and benefit

54 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 48, at 1952-53; Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415
v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
55 Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1176-80.
56 Id. at 1179.
57 Id. at 1180.
58 The threat of privatization, for example, has been used by government agencies to extract
favorable terms from public-sector employees and their labor unions. See, e.g., Craig Becker, With
Whose Hands: Privatization, Public Employment, and Democracy, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 88,
91-92 (1988). Indeed, the privatization threat can act as a form of public employee control. See id.
(describing how government agencies use the privatization threat as a form of employee discipline).
It seems reasonable to assume that like the privatization threat, an AI threat could also work to keep
the civil service compliant and in control by the agency leaders.
59 Cf. id. (indicating that the threat of privatization may lead to a less adversarial workforce).
60 ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 83.
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calculations.”61 Or an ALJ may review AI-created content in a
mechanical manner, without second-guessing the automated results.62 All
of this results in a civil service more likely to comply with—and less
likely to question—a robo-bureaucrat’s decision or decision-making
process.
C.

Restraint on Public Participation

The final way algorithmic governance consolidates agency leader
power is by restraining public participation. An agency’s use of a robobureaucrat will likely make it harder for civil society to hold the agency
accountable.63 One reason is that “many of the more advanced AI tools
are not, by their structure, fully explainable.”64 It may be impossible to
determine how a robo-bureaucrat made a decision, and therefore, it will
be harder for the public to peer inside its decision-making process.65 And
public accountability is even more constrained when a third-party AI
developer refrains from divulging information about the programs to
protect its trade secrets or other confidential information.66 Given this
opaqueness, when automated systems effectively constitute changes to
agency rules, for example, “[c]itizens cannot see or debate these new
rules.”67
This AI “black box” also has profound consequences on legal
accountability, in part, because much legal doctrine is built on notions of
human behavior, such as the doctrines of intent and causation.68 That is
why AI may disrupt doctrines such as Article III standing (which requires
causation)69 or the rational basis test (which requires a justification for
61

Citron, supra note 20, at 1272.
ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 45.
63 See id. at 7; Citron, supra note 20, at 1253–54.
64 ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 7; see also Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1179-80 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (noting that the teacher appraisal
algorithmic system was a “black box” and that it would be almost impossible for a teacher to
challenge the system’s decision-making process).
65 See Citron, supra note 20, at 1253-54 (arguing that government AI’s lack of transparency
“shields them from scrutiny” by the public).
66 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 48, at 1953 (discussing the teacher evaluation system
and noting that the third-party developer “fought to keep its source code, training data, and design
as secret as possible, initially refusing to let the plaintiffs’ experts see any of it and ultimately
agreeing only to allow one expert to review the system under extreme constraints . . . .”).
67 Citron, supra note 20, at 1254; see also id. at 1288-91.
68 See generally Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent
and Causation, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 889 (2018) (arguing that AI’s black box threatens the legal
doctrines of intent and causation because those doctrines assess foreseeability or the reasons behind
a certain decision—analyses that would be more or less useless when applied to black-box AI).
69 Id. at 927-28.
62
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government action).70 The opacity and complexity of automated systems
also works to prevent an agency from providing sufficient individual due
process before depriving a person of liberty and property using that
system.71 Specifically, these systems often undermine the due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard.72
In sum, because algorithmic governance appears likely to promote
the leadership’s agenda, marginalize the civil service, and restrain
participation by civil society, algorithmic governance threatens to
consolidate agency leader control within the agency. This concentrated
power jeopardizes the crucial balancing role the civil service and civil
society play in the administrative separation of powers. As a result, the
rise in algorithmic governance increases the risk that agency heads will
be standing alone among a coterie of obedient robo-bureaucrats to
advance their agenda—a result inconsistent with our core constitutional
commitments to a constrained and rivalrous government, and in violation
of the administrative separation of powers.
II. COUNTERING THE THREAT
Although I leave to later scholarship more detailed
recommendations to alleviate this Essay’s concerns with algorithmic
governance, to begin taking the first steps in this direction, this Essay
proposes that Congress amend federal public sector labor law to require
collective bargaining over an agency’s decision to use algorithmic
governance.
To put this proposal in context, suppose that the U.S. Department of
Labor’s (DOL) Wage and Hour Division (WHD) is considering whether
to implement a system that will use AI to automate its investigative and
enforcement functions. The WHD reasons that this system will save it
thousands of dollars. The automaton identifies businesses most likely to
have committed a wage and hour violation based on certain
characteristics of its industry, its past violations, and records of
complaints. It then automatically requests the business payroll records,
time records, government contracts, annual financial statements, and
other pertinent information. Based on this information, it creates
investigatory lines of questions and specific topics that a human
investigator is to ask employees. The WHD investigator then arrives on
70

Id. at 895, 895 n.26.
Citron, supra note 20, at 1281-88.
72 See id. (providing examples of automation systems failing to provide adequate notice, and
identifying concerns about automation bias infecting hearing officers’ decision making and the
expense of hiring experts to describe and analyze an automation system’s often complex code and
processes).
71
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the employer’s worksite, interviews employees, and inputs their answers
directly into the system. Based on this information, the AI system
determines whether the employer violated the law, appropriate corrective
actions the employer must take, the amount of back wages due (if
applicable), and the overall strength of the WHD’s legal position.
Under this Essay’s proposal, before deciding whether to adopt this
AI system, the DOL must notify the union representing the WHD
investigators and allow the union to negotiate over this system. The union
could, for example, request records and evidence related to the new
system. It could then propose that the system only analyze complaints
and identify employers to investigate; all the other tasks would be
assigned to WHD investigators. The union might also propose specific
criteria, which the system would have to consider before determining
whether a business violated the law. Or the union could propose that
rather than implement the system, the union would address the underlying
concern: cutting costs. The union might propose cuts to WHD
investigators’ salaries or bonuses, or other cost-cutting measures. This
proposal might alleviate some of the WHD’s concerns. The agency, of
course, must negotiate in good faith and consider the union’s proposal.73
When appropriate, the DOL would offer counterproposals.
If the parties cannot reach an agreement and declare impasse, they
would then follow the established procedures in federal public sector
labor relations. First, the parties are encouraged to find a third-party
neutral to mediate the dispute.74 Second, if mediation fails, either party
may seek help from the Federal Service Impasses Panel75—an entity
comprised of presidential appointees76—that has the power to impose
contract terms through a final action.77 The merits of the Federal Service
Impasses Panel’s decision may not be appealed.78 This whole process

73 See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (2018) (defining “collective bargaining” as the obligation for
both the agency and union “to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement . . . .”);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(5) (2018) (making it an unfair labor practice for an agency to refuse to
“negotiate in good faith with a” union).
74 See H. Lee Einsel, Jr., Negotiability in the Federal Sector-Focusing on Impasse Resolution,
35 A.F. L. REV. 147, 160-61 (1991).
75 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b).
76 Id. § 7119(c)(2).
77 Id. § 7119(c)(5)(C).
78 Id.
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may take more than a year,79 during which the WHD would generally be
prohibited from implementing its algorithmic enforcement system.80
Requiring bargaining over algorithmic governance alleviates several
concerns raised by this Essay. The economic and political costs that this
long and arduous process impose reduces the risk that agency leadership
will use AI to circumvent the civil service. The proposal gives the civil
service—through those employees’ elected representative—a voice into
how algorithmic governance is developed and implemented. As a result,
agency leaders will be less likely to create and implement the system to
replace workers or civil service discretionary decision making. And with
the threat of losing their jobs to a machine somewhat subsided, the civil
service should find themselves instilled with a bit more security in their
jobs.
Indeed, assuming the agency adopts the algorithmic system, workers
should have a better idea how the algorithmic system works (and how it
is not supposed to work). This is because the union will be more
encouraged to request information about the system during bargaining
and propose to the agency what the system should and should not do. This
information should presumably be available to all members of the union
likely affected by the algorithmic system. For that reason, if the
algorithmic governance program makes a decision contrary to a
bureaucrat’s moral or professional judgment, the bureaucrat overseeing
it may be more likely to challenge the program’s decisions. And with a
fuller understanding of the system’s purpose and functioning, bureaucrats
should be less likely to harbor automation bias.
CONCLUSION
As the ACUS Report suggests, the prevalence of algorithmic
governance at the federal level is likely to rise.81 Indeed, the Trump
administration issued an executive order to promote federal agencies’ AI
research and development.82 And in response to the recent COVID-19
pandemic, commentators are already proposing algorithmic governance

79 See, e.g., Naval Supply Sys. Command Fleet Logistics Ctr. Norfolk, Va., 19 F.S.I.P. 063,
2020 WL 584115 (Feb. 3, 2020) (resolving a dispute involving a new fitness program more than a
year and half after the government agency first provided notice of its intent to create the new
program).
80 Assuming the union timely invoked the services of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, the
WHD must maintain the status quo to the fullest extent possible. See U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., Wash., D.C., 55 F.L.R.A. 69, 72-73 (1999).
81 See ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 1, at 91 (“[T]he pace of AI/ML development in
government seems to be accelerating.”).
82 Exec. Order No. 13859, 84 C.F.R. 3967 (2019).
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tools to help stop further infections.83 To be sure, algorithmic governance
has the potential to benefit the public by increasing efficiency, providing
additional programs and initiatives, and augmenting enforcement efforts.
But along with its promise, comes its potential peril. Policymakers,
government officials, and others concerned about government
accountability should ensure that the use of algorithmic governance does
not lead to unchecked, concentrated power. This Essay provides a useful
starting point to that end. Considering algorithmic governance through
the lens of the administrative separation of powers, as this Essay seeks to
do, helps to further our core constitutional commitments. The public will
benefit from this consideration.

83 See, e.g., Steve Bennett, 4 Ways Government Can Use AI to Track Coronavirus, GCN (Mar.
10,
2020),
https://gcn.com/articles/2020/03/10/ai-coronavirus-tracking.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BVK8-Z2DE].

